What is happening in Venezuela?

No part of this article was generated, edited, outlined, or influenced in any way by AI.

It seems consonant with the Systems movement as a whole that the question I’m hearing most often at this moment is “What is happening with Sistema?” as opposed to the more humane (and relevant) “What is happening in Venezuela?” After all, those asking are largely the same people who, during the first Trump administration, attempted to set up music education programs in the detention centers housing refugee children, undaunted by the fact that these minors in the “care” of the state lacked such basic necessities as toothbrushes and blankets. This sorry moment for Sistema in the US was the ultimate extension, the reductio ad absurdum, of Abreu’s oft-quoted and already absurd rhetorical fantasy in which a violin in the hands would fulfill all needs both spiritual and temporal. The hungry and cold child would likely disagree.

In terms of its sociopolitical balance sheet, Sistema’s greatest asset has also been its greatest liability: its proximity to, if not inextricable association with, the Chavismo governments (encompassing both Hugo and his successor, Nicolas Maduro). As of now – as of January 3^rd, for that matter, that government has not fundamentally changed, contrary to popular belief, and so for the moment the Fundación is in no more or less danger than it was before. Consider: despite having recognized Edmundo González as the legitimate president of Venezuela following the 2024 election, the United States still allowed Delcy Rodríguez, a long-time crony of Maduro, to fill the vacuum created by his capture and extraction. Although the Venezuelan constitution demands elections within 30 days of the presidential seat being vacated, the partisan Venezuelan Supreme Court engaged in legal contortions and special pleadings to a degree that would bring a blush to even Alito’s pallid cheeks, in their effort to find loopholes to allow Rodríguez to serve indefinitely. The US’s tacit endorsement of this arrangement must be especially galling to recent Nobel Peace Prize winner María Machado, who put the sick in sycophantic in her effort to curry favour with Trump in the hope of provoking true regime change.

Maduro was arraigned in New York on charges of drug trafficking, a piece of theater that might have lent credence to the US argument that its actions of January 3^rd were motivated by its desire to choke off the narcotics trade – if Rodríguez were not herself the subject of multiple investigations within the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and listed in their files as a “priority target.” No, the real difference between Maduro and Rodríguez is that one is a fervent narco-nationalist who defied the United States on principle, while the other is a narco-opportunist who saw the potential for personal advancement through Realpolitik. The smoothness, if not seamlessness, of this transition strongly suggests some level of advance coordination between factions, with the northern one benefitting from a puppet whose loyalty is far more assured than that of the duly-elected González.

If the US action was not about drugs, was it just for oil? Well, “what do you think the Russians and Chinese wanted here? Our recipe for arepas?” said some (regrettably) unidentified Venezuelan pragmatist on camera. But oil for whom? The lifting of US sanctions originally levied in 2019 and the flow of Venezuelan oil onto international markets will have less of a positive net effect on the nation’s depleted coffers than one might think. Venezuela’s most recent national budget came in at roughly $20 billion for a population of around 29 million (for comparison, that is equivalent to the annual budget of the state of South Dakota, population ~1 million) with 53% of Venezuela’s projected revenue to come from its nationalized oil sector.  While the budget has not as yet been amended to reflect newly favourable economic circumstances, any increase in revenues will likely have very limited impact as unextracted Venezuelan oil is already largely mortgaged to service a national debt that exceeds $170 billion (200% of GDP), by some estimates, including some $60 billion in defaulted bonds. Consistent with past domestic policy, the US will likely insist that investors, holders of Venezuelan bonds or US-based claimants for compensation for nationalized/confiscated assets, take precedence over the citizenry, to the detriment of social programs which comprise about 75% of all Venezuelan government spending. Recall, in the event you had forgotten, that Sistema is funded as a social program in Venezuela.

Sistema is neither a winner nor a loser in most foreseeable scenarios, unless the US demands that its newest vassal state adopt policies similar to its own for national arts and education. And as my contacts on the ground report, life goes on in the South American nation largely unchanged. Inflation is still rampant, crime still high, goods still scarce, power still unreliable. 

The real winner here is the United States, of course. In one fell swoop the US government has achieved a meaningful measure of control over a nation without placing proverbial boots on the ground. It has bolstered its long-term energy security while excluding Russia and China economically. It has effectively cut off Cuba, another Russia-aligned regional actor and perennial thorn in Trump’s side, from its energy lifeblood and not coincidentally, most international travel. It has acquired control of a founding member of (and the original driving force behind) OPEC, and in so doing irretrievably compromised the cartel’s fundamental mission and raison d’etre to counter US influence within international petroleum markets. 

If I sound admiring, it’s because I am, if reluctantly. I can deplore the immorality and  illegality of the actions of the US and the betrayal of the Venezuelan people, while acknowledging how efficiently the current administration achieved its goals, as self-serving and anti-democratic they may be. As the saying goes, even a snoutless pig can find the occasional truffle. The truffle may be a truffle, but the pig is still a pig.